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Summary
The article is devoted to the characteristics of the ‘hung parliament’ in the Westminster Sys-
tem and its influence on government formation. Some interesting aspects has been chosen 
to illustrate the problem of minority government existence in Great Britain. Author explains 
normative and non-normative systemic factors that influenced the formation of the govern-
ment cabinets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The main thesis is that creation 
of minority governments is closely associated with the evolution of the party system and can 
be a kind of political barometer that predict or confirm appropriate changes at the party scene.
Streszczenie
Parlament zawieszony a tworzenie się rządu mniejszościowego  
w systemie westminsterskim (wybrane aspekty)
Artykuł poświęcony jest charakterystyce “zawieszonego parlamentu” w systemie west-
minsterskim i jego wpływu na tworzenie rządu. Kilka ciekawych aspektów zostało wy-
1 The author is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Systems of Highly 
Developed States of the Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Faculty of Social Scien-
ces, University of Silesia in Katowice, e-mail: robert.radek@us.edu.pl.
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branych celem zilustrowania problemu istnienia rządu mniejszościowego w  Wielkiej 
Brytanii. Autor wyjaśnia, normatywne i  nienormatywne czynniki systemowe, które 
wpłynęły na tworzenie gabinetów rządowych bez wystarczającej większości w  parla-
mencie. Główną tezą jest, że tworzenie rządów mniejszościowych jest ściśle związane 
z rozwojem systemu partyjnego i może być rodzajem barometru politycznego, dzięki 
któremu przewiduje się lub potwierdza odpowiednie zmiany na scenie partyjnej.
*
I.
A crucial aspect of the British system of government is that the government 
of the day must enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. General 
elections are held to return MPs to the House of Commons. Most commonly, 
one party has a majority of seats, and this party forms a government. Howev-
er, on a number of occasions over the last century, a general election has pro-
duced a result in which no party has a majority of Members: a situation of no 
overall control. This is known as a ‘hung Parliament’ although some prefer 
the expressions ‘balanced parliament’, ‘minority parliament’ or ‘No Over-
all Control’ (NOC)2. In such circumstances, there are four likely outcomes. 
These have been set out by Paul Norton as follows3:
 – a minority government;
 – a coalition;
 – a failure to produce a government at all;
 – two or more of these things during the lifetime of a parliament.
Although hung parliaments are common in other parliamentary democ-
racies, they are relatively rare in the Westminster Parliament, where the First 
Past the Post electoral system usually rewards the party with the most votes 
with a majority of seats. In fact, Westminster has experienced a hung parlia-
2 The term hung parliament derives from the American term ‘hung jury’ and was im-
ported into British political discourse in the 1970s.
3 P. Norton, The Perils of a  Hung Parliament, [in:] No Overall Control? The Impact of 
a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, Hansard Society 2008, 
p. 109.
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ment in 2010, and there were only five others in the 20th century, following 
the general elections of January 1910, December 1910, December 1923, May 
1929 and February 1974. There were also two instances where the govern-
ment lost its majority in the Commons between general elections, in April 
1977 and February 1997. These situations of no overall control resulted from 
parties losing seats over the course of a Parliament, through by-elections and 
defections. When a general election is called, the government at the time re-
mains in office over the general election period. If the governing party is re-
turned, they stay in office and when the situation is completely vice-versa 
they must resign. The monarch would then ask the leader of the party which 
can command control of the House of Commons to form a new government. 
However, if no party commands a majority, the previous government might 
remain in position and there might be a period of negotiation whilst they try 
to build a coalition, or else decide to try to govern with a minority of Mem-
bers of Parliament. The United Kingdom is quite unusual in modern democ-
racies in having no written constitution, that is, no single document com-
prising the rules of constitutional practice. In the UK the fundamental rules 
of constitutional practice are enshrined in various acts of Parliament, in the 
common law, in judicial decisions, in parliamentary law and customs, and 
in constitutional conventions. As these change and develop in part in reac-
tion to circumstances and events it could be said that the “unwritten” consti-
tution is constantly evolving and adapting itself. It is these conventions and 
precedents which inform what happens when a situation of no overall con-
trol of Parliament develops4.
It is important to remember that Westminster, so-called ‘mother of parlia-
ments’, has had to suffer the parent’s fate of witnessing her offspring grow up, 
reject many of her old-fashioned ways, and strike out in directions she herself 
finds too bold and frightening5. One notable example is the extent to which 
single party majority government has remained the norm at Westminster, un-
like in almost all continental European legislatures and, increasingly, the more 
4 L. Maer, Hung Parliaments, House of Commons Library 2010, p. 3, (information pro-
vided to Members of Parliament on the basis of Standard Note SN/PC/04951).
5 A. Paun, Introduction, [in:] Making Minority Government Work. Hung Parliaments and 
the Challenges for Westminster and Whitehall, eds. R. Hazell, A, Paun, Institute for Govern-
ment, London 2010, p. 10.
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closely-related Commonwealth parliaments too. As a result of the ‘first past the 
post’ electoral system and the dominance of a two (or two and a half)6 national 
party system, every election in the postwar era bar one has returned a majority 
for either Labour (8 times) or the Conservatives (9 times), with the size of the 
majority ranging from 3 to 179 (see Table 1 presented below).
Table 1. Share of seats won by governing party since 1945
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 Feb. 1974 Oct. 1974
Labour +146 +5 +4 +96 -33 +3
Conservative +17 +54 +100 +31
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015
Labour +179 +167 +61
Conservative +43 +144 +102 +21 -20 +6
Source: Own work based on UK Election Statistics at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.
uk (30.08.2015).
As Arend Lijphart claims the frequency of single-party majorities has helped 
create a political culture where elections are portrayed as winner-takes-all battles 
between two great political tribes. In academic discourse, the electoral system, as 
well as constitutional features such as weak local government and the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty, has led the UK to be characterized as a strongly 
majoritarian system, in contradistinction to the ‘consensual’ democracies to be 
found in other parts of Europe7. The spectre that haunts the Westminster mod-
el is an inconclusive election, in which no one party wins an overall majority. As 
noted, only few elections in nearly four decades has returned a ‘parliament of mi-
norities’, although Jim Callaghan in 1976 and John Major in 1996 both saw their 
majorities wiped out by by-election defeats and defections. Casting further back 
into history, however, reveals that Westminster does in fact have significant ex-
6 J. Blondel, Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies, “Canadi-
an Journal of Political Science” 1968, vol. 1, no. 2.
7 The fundamental book with a deep analysis A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Govern-
ment Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
177Robert Radek • Hung Parliament and Minority Government Formation...
perience of minority and coalition government. The general elections in May 
2010 confirmed such situation and also some predictions before elections in 2015 
were also suggesting the problem of hung parliament, however the results hav-
en’t confirmed it. Additionally, the growing popularity of ‘minor’ parties and in-
dependent candidates in recent years leaves a significant grey area on the swin-
gometer between Labour and Conservative majorities.
II.
During last several years at regular intervals, political polls have predicted that 
a hung parliament in Great Britain is a highly possible – even likely – scenar-
io following the next general election. Since the autumn of 2006, a hung par-
liament has been regularly predicted every few months in the polls. The like-
lihood of a hung parliament has increased for two reasons – firstly, because of 
the growth of third parties and secondly, because of the changes in the way 
that the electoral system translates popular votes into seats in the Commons. 
The way in which the First Past the Post system exaggerates a majority in votes 
into a much larger majority in seats has long been described in terms of a ‘cube 
law’: If votes are divided A:B, seats will be divided A3:B3. The cube law sug-
gests that, in a 600-member parliament, for every 1% swing between the par-
ties, 18 seats will switch to the winning side. The cube law worked remarkably 
well from 1931 to 1970. But it then emerged as a statistical coincidence rather 
than an iron law. The exaggeration dropped from 18 seats switching for each 
1% swing down to 12 or fewer. The cube law had in fact become a square law. 
If the cube law had still worked in 1983, Margaret Thatcher’s clear majority 
would have been 250, not 142 and Tony Blair’s lead in 1997 would have been 
229, not 179. Landslides are smaller than they used to be and narrow majori-
ties have become narrower. Defenders of First Past the Post with its exaggerat-
ed majorities used to claim that at least the system treated the two big parties 
fairly: it produced roughly the same winner’s bonus whichever side won. But in 
the 1990s the system moved out of kilter. Labour stood to win more seats than 
the Conservatives for any given percentage of the vote8.
8 D. Butler, Hung Parliaments: Context and Background, [in:] No Overall Control?, op.cit., 
pp. 8–9. See also an article in a monograph of scientific project financed by National Scien-
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III.
According to David Butler problems with collecting clear majority in par-
liament will always lead to minority government or coalition government, 
which are not really expected in the tradition of British political thought9.
It is believed that minority governments have survived on different kinds 
of understanding. For example from 1910 to 1914 the issue of Home Rule 
made the 80 Irish Nationalists eager to keep the Liberals in office. In 1924 the 
Liberals thought it expedient to give the first Labour government a chance 
and they were dismayed when, after nine months, Ramsey Macdonald opt-
ed for a  general election because the Liberals had voted against him over 
his refusal to hold an inquiry into the Campbell case. In 1929 they again 
gave Labour mistrustful support in return for a promise of electoral reform. 
Between 1945 and 1974, the electorate returned majority governments. On 
a few occasions, these majorities were small, but in no instance was a coa-
lition formed. In 1950–1951 Labour governed with a majority of 5. In 1950, 
no attempt was made by the government to gain Liberal support during the 
18 months of that administration. When the Conservatives won the elec-
tion of 1951 with an overall majority of 17, Winston Churchill offered a Cab-
inet post to the leader of the Liberals (Clement Davies) who did not accept. 
In 1964–1966 Labour held office with a majority of four and no positive ap-
proaches were made to the Liberals. Another general election was held af-
ter 18 months. In February 1974, the incumbent Conservative government 
lost its majority. Edward Heath remained as Prime Minister for a few days 
while instead of resigning immediately he tried to form a coalition with Lib-
erals under leadership of Jeremy Thorpe and with the Ulster Unionists un-
der leadership of Harry West. This would have been sufficient to give him 
an overall majority. Unsuccessful negotiations lead to the change of govern-
ment. Heath was replaced as Prime Minister by Harold Wilson. Wilson then 
governed for six months with a minority government. As many research-
ce Center (Poland) M. Domagała, Bias, czyli deformacje brytyjskiego system wyborczego, [in:] 
Wpływ deformacji wyborczych na systemy polityczne, ed. J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014.
9 For example British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli once said: ‘England does not 
love coalitions’. See B. Disraeli, House of Commons Hansard, 16 December 1852, col. 1666, at: 
http://tinyurl.com/disraeli-coalition (10.10.2015).
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ers claim Labour were able to survive these months as a minority govern-
ment quite easily because of the willingness of Conservatives to abstain on 
key votes – for they did not wish to precipitate an immediate second election 
in the wake of their earlier defeat10. In March 1974 Harold Wilson offered no 
understandings but gambled on winning an election if it were forced on him. 
The general election of October 1974 resulted in an overall majority for La-
bour of 3, but a majority over the Conservatives of 42. Labour formed a gov-
ernment. However, by 1977–1978 the Labour government had to systemat-
ically draw on the support of the Liberals11. After 1976 when Labour’s new 
majority had evaporated, Jim Callaghan negotiated with the Liberals and in 
1977–1978 entered into the formal Lib-Lab pact. In February 1997 John Ma-
jor found that by-elections and floor-crossings had whittled his majority of 
20 down to minus one; however, a general election was imminent and the 
loss of his current majority was the least of his problems12.
For many years since the 19th century coalition governments have nev-
er been planned in a premeditated fashion. For significant parts of the first 
half of the twentieth century, there were coalition administrations. However, 
these twentieth century coalitions only occurred at times of war, economic 
crisis, or as a prelude to mergers between political parties. For example, be-
tween 1931 and 1940 a national government, led at various points by Mac-
Donald (1931–1935), Baldwin (1935–1937) and Chamberlain (1937–1940) in-
cluded National Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Nationals, and until 1932, 
the Liberals. In 1940, a wartime government of national unity was formed 
under Churchill which included Conservatives, Labour and Liberals, last-
ing until 1945. A wartime government of national unity had also been estab-
lished during the First World War, which continued until 1922. No formal 
coalition governed from Westminster between 1945 and 201013. However, in 
the October 1974 election Edward Heath put forward the idea of a govern-
10 V. Bogdanor, A Hung Parliament: a Political Problem Not a Constitutional One, [in:] 
No Overall Control?, op.cit., pp. 17–18. See also J. Curtice, Dilemmas of a Hung Parliament, 
March 1992, p. 9.
11 L. Maer, Hung Parliaments..., p. 8.
12 D. Butler, Hung Parliaments..., pp. 10–11.
13 L. Maer, Hung Parliaments in the Twentieth Century, House of Commons, Briefing 
Paper no. 04951, 8 May 2015, p. 14.
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ment of national unity and in 1997 Tony Blair, not foreseeing his landside 
victory, certainly contemplated a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. But 
the most serious example of such governing model was experienced in year 
2010–2015. The Conservative Party, led by David Cameron, won the larg-
est number of votes and seats but still fell twenty seats short. This resulted in 
a hung parliament second time since World War II. Such untypical situation 
of hung parliament had this time been widely considered and predicted and 
both the country and politicians were better prepared for the constitution-
al process that would follow such a result. Coalition talks began immediate-
ly between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats and lasted for five 
days. There was an aborted attempt to put together a Labour/Liberal Dem-
ocrat coalition (although other smaller parties would have been required to 
make up the ten seats they lacked for a majority). To facilitate this Gordon 
Brown announced on the evening of Monday 10 May that he would resign 
as Labour Party leader. Realising that a deal with the Conservatives was in 
reach, the next day on Tuesday 11 May, Brown announced his resignation 
as Prime Minister, marking the end of 13 years of Labour government. This 
was accepted by Queen Elizabeth II, who then invited David Cameron to 
form a government in her name and become Prime Minister. Just after mid-
night on 12 May, the Liberal Democrats emerged from a meeting of their 
Parliamentary party and Federal Executive to announce that the coalition 
deal had been ‘approved overwhelmingly’, sealing a coalition government of 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats14.
IV.
According to Vernon Bogdanor a hung parliament or even a succession of 
hung parliaments need not always lead to a constitutional crisis. A hung par-
liament may instead lead to a political crisis, but that is something for the po-
litical leaders, not the sovereign, to resolve. A hung parliament merely makes 
transparent the fundamental principle of parliamentary government, a prin-
14 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8675913.stm 
(30.08.2015), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8676539.
stm (30.08.2015).
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ciple which has often been overt since 1866: a government depends upon the 
confidence of Parliament15. In such extraordinary situation it is important to 
clarify the constitutional regulations. The appointment of the Prime Minis-
ter and the granting of a dissolution of Parliament are both prerogative pow-
ers of the monarch. On the former, the Sovereign must appoint that per-
son who is in the best position to receive the support of the majority in the 
House of Commons. On the latter, in the absence of a regular term for the 
life of Parliament fixed by statute, the Sovereign may by the prerogative dis-
solve Parliament and cause a general election to be held. However, in a situ-
ation of no overall control, these conventions may be put under some strain 
by the absence of a clear way forward16.
After last British hung parliament in 2010 elites decided to set the main 
laws, rules and conventions affecting the conduct and operation of the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom. They called them the ‘Cabinet Manual17’, 
which is a  government document written by Her Majesty’s Civil Service, 
led by Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus O’Donnell18. It was published by the Cab-
inet Office in a  rough version on 14 December 2010 and officially signed 
15 V. Bogdanor, A Hung Parliament..., p. 25.
16 L. Maer, Hung Parliaments..., p. 15.
17 The Cabinet Manual. A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of govern-
ment, 1st Edition, October 2011, Cabinet Office, Whitehall, London 2011, https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/cabinet-manual (31.08.2015).
18 The wording and appearance of the document resembles that of a written constitu-
tion and the writing of the Manual was originally initiated by Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
as part of his broader plan to establish a written constitution for the UK. In February 2010 
during his speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research, Prime Minister announced that 
he had asked Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus O’Donnell to ‘consolidate the existing unwritten, 
piecemeal conventions that govern much of the way central government operates under our 
existing constitution into a single written document’. Sir Gus and his team in the Cabinet 
Office travelled to New Zealand, which uses the Westminster system of government and also 
lacks a codified constitution. Using the New Zealand Cabinet Manual as precedent, the Cabi-
net Office published a draft Cabinet Manual for the UK in December 2010 which was scru-
tinised by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, the House of Commons Political 
and Constitutional Reform Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee. 
However in 2011 the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that the document was 
‘not the first step to a written constitution’ as it only describes the existing rules and does 
not ‘set existing practice in stone’. The Manual does not need to be formally approved by 
Parliament and can be modified at any time by the Cabinet Secretary. See: http://www.publi-
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in a finalised version by Prime Minister David Cameron in October 2011. 
The Manual gives an overview of the UK’s system of government, reflect-
ing the importance of Parliament, Cabinet government and the democrat-
ic nature of the UK’s constitutional arrangements by explaining the pow-
ers of the Executive, Sovereign, Parliament, international institutions (most 
notably the European Union), the Crown Dependencies, British Overseas 
Territories and the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales. The Manual was written as a guide for members of Cabinet, oth-
er ministers and civil servants in the execution of government business, but 
also serves to bring greater transparency about the mechanisms of govern-
ment and consolidate many of the previously unwritten constructional con-
ventions through which the British government operates.
The initialising situation in the context of hung parliament is always con-
nected with the fundamental principles of government formation. It ought 
to be remembered that the ability of a government to command the confi-
dence of the elected House of Commons is central to its authority to govern. 
Prime Ministers hold office unless and until they resign. If the Prime Min-
ister resigns on behalf of the Government, the Sovereign will invite anoth-
er person19 who appears most likely to be able to command the confidence 
of the House to serve as Prime Minister and to form a government20. For 
many years it was characteristic that the Sovereign has made use of reserve 
powers to dismiss a Prime Minister or to make a personal choice of succes-
sor, although this was last used in 1834 and was regarded as having under-
mined the Sovereign. Nowadays the convention has been that the Sovereign 
should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the respon-
sibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the par-
ties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clear-
ly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence 
of the House of Commons. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsi-
cations.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldconst/107/10703.htm (31.08.2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12669011 (31.08.2015).
19 In the twentieth century there were only several examples of Prime Ministers, who 
resigned and were asked to form a  new administration (e.g. Ramsay McDonald, Winston 
Churchill).
20 See 2.7 & 2.8 The Cabinet Manual..., p. 14.
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bility falls especially on the incumbent Prime Minister, who at the time of 
his or her resignation may also be asked by the Sovereign for a recommen-
dation on who can best command the confidence of the House of Commons 
in his or her place21.
Most typical for Britain is the situation where after the election, if an in-
cumbent government retains an overall majority – that is, where the number 
of seats won by the largest party in an election exceeds the combined num-
ber of seats for all the other parties in the new Parliament – it will normally 
continue in office and resume normal business. In this case it is quite obvi-
ous that there is no need for the Sovereign to ask the Prime Minister to con-
tinue. If the election results in an overall majority for a different party, the 
incumbent Prime Minister and government will immediately resign and the 
Sovereign will invite the leader of the party that has won the election to form 
a new government.
More complicated is the situation which results in parliament with no 
overall control in the House of Commons. Such extraordinary situation 
should be resolved in the following procedure. Firstly, the incumbent gov-
ernment remains in office unless and until the Prime Minister tenders his or 
her resignation and the Government’s resignation to the Sovereign. An in-
cumbent government is entitled to wait until the new Parliament has met to 
see if it can command the confidence of the House of Commons, but is ex-
pected to resign if it becomes clear that it is unlikely to be able to command 
that confidence and there is a clear alternative. Secondly, where a range of 
different administrations could potentially be formed, political parties may 
wish to hold discussions to establish who is best able to command the con-
fidence of the House of Commons and should form the next government. 
The Sovereign would not expect to become involved in any negotiations, al-
though there are responsibilities on those involved in the process to keep the 
Palace informed. This could be done by political parties or the Cabinet Sec-
retary. The Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister may also have 
a role, for example, in communicating with the Palace. Thirdly, if the lead-
ers of the political parties involved in any negotiations seek the support of 
the Civil Service, this support may only be organised by the Cabinet Secre-
21 See 2.9 The Cabinet Manual..., p. 14.
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tary with the authorisation of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister au-
thorises any support it would be focused and provided on an equal basis to 
all the parties involved, including the party that was currently in govern-
ment. The Civil Service would continue to advise the incumbent government 
in the usual way22.
The nature of the government formed is usually dependent on discus-
sions between political parties and any resulting agreement. Where there is 
no overall majority, there are essentially three broad types of government 
that could be formed23:
 – single-party, minority government, where the party may (although not 
necessarily) be supported by a series of ad hoc agreements based on 
common interests;
 – formal inter-party agreement, for example the Liberal–Labour pact 
from 1977 to 1978;
 – formal coalition government, which generally consists of ministers 
from more than one political party, and typically commands a majori-
ty in the House of Commons.
In the second chapter of ‘Manual’ the reader can find other useful addi-
tional information like for example changing procedures of Prime Minis-
ter or government during the parliament (2.18–2.20), pre-election contracts 
with opposition parties (2.21), dissolution of parliament (2.22–2.25) and re-
strictions on government activity (2.26–2.34). They contain plenty of de-
tailed rules, but it is not possible to analyse them in one paper, so it is going 
to be omitted.
V.
What is crucial for a minority government maintaining in the political sys-
tem, is the balance of power shifted to the critical party or parties that can 
determine the outcome in a parliamentary vote (so called veto players). Crit-
ics of the present electoral system argue that the system gives disproportion-
ate power to the largest single party. A hung parliament has the same effect as 
22 See 2.12& 2.13& 2.14 The Cabinet Manual..., pp. 14–15.
23 See 2.17 The Cabinet Manual..., p. 15.
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systems of proportional representation, transferring disproportionate power 
to the smallest or one of the smallest parties. Arguments about proportional-
ity miss the point that 10% of the votes translated into 10% of the seats does 
not then translate into 10% of the negotiating power in the House of Com-
mons; it translates into far more than that once one becomes a veto player24.
Critics of hung parliaments in general argue that it will inherently result 
in weak and unstable government with ministers lacking the power and au-
thority to deal with pressing economic, social and national security chal-
lenges. In contrast, its supporters argue that it will fundamentally alter the 
culture of politics in this country for the better, requiring a broader cross 
section of elected representatives to be included in the policy making pro-
cess, providing greater transparency and restraining the authority of the ex-
ecutive whilst empowering the collective influence of parliament. There is 
also another positive factor of minority government as a result of hung par-
liament – responsibility of elites because minority government, encompass-
ing and having consulted with a broad swath of representative opinion with-
in the House of Commons, may provide a platform for the political leaders to 
take bolder decisions than might otherwise be the case not least because re-
sponsibility for those difficult decisions will be shared by more than one par-
ty and one political leader25.
Political decisiveness is linked to a government’s capacity to legislate and 
here too the precedents demonstrate that a hung Parliament can still be ef-
fective. In 1974, for example, the number of bills that became statute com-
pared very favourably with the legislative outputs of prior and subsequent 
sessions, given that it was a year of two general elections26. There is no reason 
why a minority government cannot pursue a broad legislative programme 
though it may need to be more persuasive and consensual in its approach 
to policy making than would otherwise be the case if it was governing in its 
own right.
24 P. Norton, The Perils of a Hung..., p. 110.
25 R. Blackburn, R. Fox, O. Gay, L. Maer, Who Governs? Forming a Coalition or a Mi-
nority Government in the Event of a Hung Parliament, Hansard Society & Study of Parliament 
Group 2010, p. 14.
26 A. Brazier, Parliamentary Procedure Without Commons Majority, [in:] No Overall Con-
trol?, op.cit., p. 36.
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Finally, the cultural impact of hung parliament should be remembered. 
It is believed that the greatest changes in parliamentary practice would be 
delivered as a result of a period of minority government rather than coali-
tion. The coalition requires adherence to collective responsibility and would 
therefore require cohesive party unity in order to work. In contrast, minori-
ty government might enhance the power of backbenchers because individual 
MPs and interest groups are better placed to secure concessions27.
In conclusion minority governments which may be the consequence of 
hung parliament in Westminster system should not always be criticised. 
With the coalition governments they both reflects the changes in the par-
ty system and transfer of electoral system deformations on political system. 
However Britain has experienced several times hung parliaments it does not 
mean the tendency to serious changes in the political system. It is also worth 
to notice that there was done an expected work in the constitutional system 
resulted in ‘Cabinet Manual’ a written document, which helps to regulate 
a delicate sphere between legislative and executive branch.
Literature
Blackburn R., Fox R., Gay O., Maer L., Who Governs? Forming a Coalition or a Minori-
ty Government in the Event of a Hung Parliament, Hansard Society & Study of Par-
liament Group 2010.
Blondel J., Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies, “Canadi-
an Journal of Political Science” 1968, vol. 1, no. 2.
Bogdanor V., A Hung Parliament: a Political Problem Not a Constitutional One, [in:] No 
Overall Control? The Impact of a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Bra-
zier, S. Kalitowski, Hansard Society 2008.
Brazier A., Parliamentary Procedure Without Commons Majority, [in:] No Overall Con-
trol? The Impact of a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kali-
towski, Hansard Society 2008.
Butler D., Hung Parliaments: Context and Background, [in:] No Overall Control? The Im-
pact of a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, Han-
sard Society 2008.
Curtice J., Dilemmas of a Hung Parliament, March 1992.
27 R. Blackburn, R. Fox, O. Gay, L. Maer, Who Governs..., p. 15.
187Robert Radek • Hung Parliament and Minority Government Formation...
Disraeli B., House of Commons Hansard, 16 December 1852, col. 1666, http://tinyurl.
com/disraeli-coalition.
Domagała M., Bias, czyli deformacje brytyjskiego system wyborczego, [in:] Wpływ defor-
macji wyborczych na systemy polityczne, red. J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014.
Lijphart A., Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, Yale University Press, 1999.
Maer L., Hung Parliaments in the Twentieth Century, House of Commons, Briefing Pa-
per no. 04951, 8 May 2015.
Maer L., Hung Parliaments, House of Commons Library 2010 (information provided to 
Members of Parliament on the basis of Standard Note SN/PC/04951).
No Overall Control? The Impact of a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, 
S. Kalitowski, Hansard Society 2008.
Norton P., The Perils of a  Hung Parliament, [in:] No Overall Control? The Impact of 
a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, Hansard Soci-
ety 2008.
Paun A., Introduction, [in:] Making Minority Government Work. Hung Parliaments and 
the Challenges for Westminster and Whitehall, eds. R. Hazell, A, Paun, Institute for 
Government, London 2010.
The Cabinet Manual. A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of gov-
ernment, 1st Edition, October 2011, Cabinet Office, Whitehall, London 2011, https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/cabinet-manual.
